People tend to forget that in the British Raj there were the provinces and some 550 or so princely states; with the withdrawal of the British Raj, in principle, the princely states were free to go their own way.
Indeed, if it were upto the remaining British imperialists, such as Winston Churchill, that is what would likely have happened.
As it turns out, Sardar Patel, V.P. Menon, with assists from Lord Mountbatten made the accession of the states seem so easy, that that unity is taken for granted.
Indeed, if it were upto the remaining British imperialists, such as Winston Churchill, that is what would likely have happened.
[On 29 March 1945, Viceroy Wavell met Prime Minister Churchill in London]. A record of this meeting is unavailable. But one can get some idea of what was discussed from a cryptic entry made by the viceroy in his diary that night: The PM then launched into a long jeremiad about India which lasted for about forty minutes. He seems to favour partition of India into Pakistan, Hindustan and Princestan.The British imperialists definitely played a role in the partition of India, and we know of the support, e.g., Churchill gave Hyderabad; and the more successful support he gave to Jinnah. Were it up to them, India would not even have had the unity it now has. Indian unity was thus not a consequence desired by the imperialists, and any claim of it as a benefit of the Empire is ludicrous. Let us be clear - the unity of India owes to the English who were dissolving the Empire, not those who would have maintained it.
As it turns out, Sardar Patel, V.P. Menon, with assists from Lord Mountbatten made the accession of the states seem so easy, that that unity is taken for granted.
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sadhana · 635 weeks ago
(post 1/2)
"During the period between 16 April and 2 May 1947, the withdrawal plan was drafted and redrafted by Lord Ismay and his colleagues at least a dozen times. According to Mountbatten's report, its broad outlines were shown to Nehru and Jinnah by Sir Eric Mieville, the viceroy's principal secretary. Both leaders gave their approval to this plan, but, in fact, the points shown to Nehru gave him no idea of the full scheme. On 2 May 1947, Lord Ismay left for London with the plan and on 6 May wired back that the preliminary reactions back home had been favourable. . .
In Simla 10 and 11 May 1947 were days of high drama. The plan sent to London on 2 May was received back, with HMG's approval on 10 May, without any real amendments, except that its language had further diluted the concept of Indian unity. That night Mountbatten gave it to Nehru to get his reaction. This step was against the advice of his staff, who felt it should be shown to all parties or to none at all.Mountbatten maintained that he did so on a 'hunch' and this 'hunch' saved his viceroyalty from failure. However, it is doubtful whether Mountbatten would have had his famous 'hunch' to take Nehru into confidence, if he did not also have a 'hunch' that V.P. Menon's plan[of Britain handing over power to two strong governments and preventing princely states from asserting independence ]was the better solution to secure all his three objectives[Partition, Dominion Status, membership of Commonwealth] in one go.
The Ismay plan had a bewildering impact on Nehru. He stayed awake till 4 a.m. and the next morning the viceroy received a handwritten note, later followed by a typewritten one, rejecting the plan in most emphatic terms. To Nehru acquiescence in splitting the Punjab and Bengal did not imply casting away the geographical and historical oneness of India. The concept of India having full continuity as conceived by the creation of the Constituent Assembly from which the Muslim-majority areas might be shed, but to which most princely states would adhere, was one thing.
To give various parts of the country the initial option of independence-creating numerous potential successor states and then their combining to form one, two or more dominions- was quite another. Nehru wrote that the plan would Balkanise India, lead to a breakdown of the central authority, provoke civil conflict and greatly demoralize(by making headless) the Army, the police and the civil services. Working under pressure, Nehru had produced possibly the most persuasive letter he ever wrote. Mountbatten immediately understood that the Congress Party would not accept his plan. . .
It was characteristic of Mountbatten that 'in a moment of calamity his thought was not how to muffle the difficulties with compromises or procastrination but to find an alternative course to recapture the initiative and succeed.' Moreover, Mountbatten now had a fall-back position. From one moment to another, he jettisoned his plan and adopted V.P.Menon's ideas and informed London accordingly. This move was carried out with such alacrity that it has been suggested that the first plan was shown to Nehru to browbeat him to accept the second. This was not so. . . Nehru[however] was brought down to earth by the imminent danger facing his own country. The Ismay plan, therefore, did contribute to his accepting partition beyond the amputation of the Punjab and Bengal and agree to independence on a dominion status basis. . .
Mountbatten was summoned back to the UK to explain his U-turn. Upon reaching London, he immediately went into a meeting with the British Cabinet. He explained that the possibility of the Indian parties willing accepting partition and the transfer of power on a dominion status basis, which would mean India remaining in the British Commonwealth,was an entirely new and very significant development. He emphasized that to secure the Congress Party's agreement, power would have to be transferred immediately. . . Attlee, as usual, was decisive. The draft of the Indian Independence Bill based on the new plan, he said, would be ready in six weeks after 3 June, the date on which the plan was to be announced.
http://sites.google.com/site/cabinetmissionplan/s...
sadhana · 635 weeks ago
(post 2/2)
The next step was to obtain the approval of the leaders of the opposition, including Winston Churchill. Churchill was unhappy that Mountbatten had accepted the viceroyalty. Churchill had built him up to serve and uphold the old Empire, least expecting him to agree to go out and dismantle it. Mountbatten described to me in 1973 how his meeting with Churchill had gone.(This meeting must have been on 20 or 21 May because, according to the record, when he saw him on 22 May under Attlee's instruction, Churchill gave him a letter approving the plan.)
Churchill was at the time in bed with a severe cold and Mountbatten was shown to his bedroom. 'As soon as he saw me come through the door he turned away to face the other side without acknowledging my presence,' Mountbatten recounted. He pulled up a chair and sat down without saying a word. After a few minutes of absolute silence, Churchill growled: 'I know why you have come to see me.' Mountbatten said that he then enquired about his cold. There was silence again; and then another growl: 'Keep them as Dominions and in the Commonwealth at least.' Mountbatten replied at once:'That is exactly what I have been able to do.'
This response had a therapeutic effect on Churchill, who turned, the cold forgotten, to listen to him with attention. Mountbatten then recounted to him how he had been able to obtain the separation of Pakistan from Hindustan and yet keep them both as dominions and in the Commonwealth. Churchill was moved. 'He thanked me with moistened eyes and promised to support the India Independence Bill in the House of Commons if it adhered to what I had reported to him.'
When Mountbatten saw Churchill again on 22 May, he mentioned that, before he had left Delhi, he had secured the assurance of the Congress Party to his new plan in writing. He, however, pointed out that he had not yet managed to get Jinnah's assent, though he had no doubt that he(Jinnah) would ultimately accept it. Churchill's reply is quoted in Mountbatten's report:'It is a matter of life and death for Pakistan to accept this offer with both hands. By god! He[Jinnah] is one man who cannot do without British help.' And Churchill pointedly asked Mountbatten to pass on this advice from him to Jinnah.
Churchill, a few months earlier, had condemned, in Parliament, the formation of the Constituent Assembly, calling the Indian legislators in it 'men of straw of whom in a few years no trace will remain'. He also lambasted the Labour Government for its India policy...
When Mountbatten met Churchill on 22 May 1947, the latter had given him a letter for Attlee approving the Mountbatten-Attlee plan based on 'an effective acceptance of Dominion status for the several parts of a divided India...' This letter suggests that he was under the impression that dominion status had been accepted by India and Pakistan as a permanent feature. Further, the letter suggests that Churchill was expecting more dominions, not merely two, to emerge from the Indian Empire- the larger princely states most likely.
Mountbatten next met Churchill at the reception in Buckingham Palace for Princess Elizabeth's (the future Queen) wedding in November 1947. Churchill hurled angry words at him suggesting that his former protege had led him up the garden path. Then Churchill turned and walked away in full view of the assembled guests. He refused to talk to Mountbatten for many years thereafter. . .
https://sites.google.com/site/cabinetmissionplan/...