As a reminder to self:
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan (2007), The Impossibility of Religious Freedom
Introduction (PDF file)
Blurb (emphasis added):
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan (2007), The Impossibility of Religious Freedom
Introduction (PDF file)
Blurb (emphasis added):
The Constitution may guarantee it. But religious freedom in America is, in fact, impossible. So argues this timely and iconoclastic work by law and religion scholar Winnifred Sullivan. Sullivan uses as the backdrop for the book the trial of Warner vs. Boca Raton, a recent case concerning the laws that protect the free exercise of religion in America. The trial, for which the author served as an expert witness, concerned regulations banning certain memorials from a multiconfessional nondenominational cemetery in Boca Raton, Florida. The book portrays the unsuccessful struggle of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish families in Boca Raton to preserve the practice of placing such religious artifacts as crosses and stars of David on the graves of the city-owned burial ground.
Sullivan demonstrates how, during the course of the proceeding, citizens from all walks of life and religious backgrounds were harassed to define just what their religion is. She argues that their plight points up a shocking truth: religion cannot be coherently defined for the purposes of American law, because everyone has different definitions of what religion is. Indeed, while religious freedom as a political idea was arguably once a force for tolerance, it has now become a force for intolerance, she maintains.
A clear-eyed look at the laws created to protect religious freedom, this vigorously argued book offers a new take on a right deemed by many to be necessary for a free democratic society. It will have broad appeal not only for religion scholars, but also for anyone interested in law and the Constitution.
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan is associate professor of law and director of the Law and Religion Program at the University at Buffalo Law School. She is also the author of Paying the Words Extra: Religious Discourse in the Supreme Court of the United States.
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dwc · 368 weeks ago
"In short, the liberal state, in trying to transform questions about falsity into
issues about “truth for others” is entirely consistent in allowing these others
(“religious authorities”) to tell its courts of law what that “truth” is. We cannot
convict the state of inconsistency, but only argue that it accepts the “theologies”
of Semitic religions"
macgupta 81p · 368 weeks ago
"Biblically literate in a lay sense, Ryskamp felt no hesitation in openly preferring his own reading of the Hebrew Bible to that of the rabbi. He also felt no compunction about preferring his own version of church history to that of the church historian. Religion appeared to be judged in his courtroom according to the fabled “I know it when I see it” standard."
In this telling, the "religious authorities" tried to, but failed, to tell the courts of law of the liberal state what the "truth" is.
The correct statement would be that in order to delineate the boundary between the religious and the secular, the courts of law use somebody's theology to make their decisions, whether that be of "religious authorities" or the judge's own beliefs; the theology used is not necessarily that of the plaintiffs in the case. Note in such cases it is a set of people against the state, where the claim is that the secular state overstepped its bounds and intruded into the religious sphere. The state thus becomes a judge of whether the practices of the plaintiffs is truly religious or not. A truly neutral state could only point out self-contradictions in plaintiffs's position, but would not be able to go beyond that.
dwc · 368 weeks ago
(a) the plaintiff
(b) the representatives of the plaintiff
(c) the defendant (in this case, the state)
(d) the representatives of the state
If we pick up (a) and (b), everyone can appeal to the freedom of religion to do whatever he/she wants. Look at any practice one finds distasteful: anti-vaccination; polygamy; female genital mutilation; etc. What does this lead to? This is where Rawl's step in: in a liberal democracy, one has to find some common ground; this is called public reason. I am not defending the liberal state or polygamy. The way the problem is set up is faulty. Instead of looking at this way, just selling the slogans of "impossibility of religious freedom" is just absurd.
macgupta 81p · 366 weeks ago