Tuesday, March 12, 2013

Greek "Religion"

The very beginning of Balu's The Heathen in His Blindness has this:


Sir Moses Finley would quite sympathise with Gill’s difficulty.  {Sam Gill's difficulty in finding religion among native Americans}  He too confronts a similar problem regarding the Ancient Greek religion, which appears “fundamentally alien to our eyes”. How fundamentally alien it is, says Sir Finley (1985: xiv-xvi), can easily be shown by a simple listing: 
(1) Greek religion had no sacred books...no revelation, no creed. It also lacked any central ecclesiastical organization or the support of central political organization...
(2) Although large numbers of men and women were involved in the administration of religion, in the case of temples and altars or sacred sites, in the conduct of festivals and sacrifices, and so forth, and though we call them ‘priests’ in the modern languages, a priesthood as that vocation is understood in many post-ancient religions simply did not exist.The great majority of the so-called priests were simply public officials whose duties in whole or in part, usually the latter, included some responsibility for some portions of the religious activity of the community. More often than not, they were selected by lot and they held office for only a year or even six months...There was no special training, no sense of vocation.
Greek ‘priests’, in sum, were customarily not holy men; they were also not particularly expert or qualified in matters pertaining to their duties in office...
(3) It follows as a matter of simple logic that places of worship were also radically different from anything known in later ages – despite the fact that the temple was the most extensive and imposing building of the Greek city...the temple was hardly ever ‘a place for congregational worship.’

In other words, Greek religion does not look as though it were a religion; nonetheless, it requires to be made sense of, says Sir Finley. Need one add, as a religion?

John Gould (1985: 7-8) attempts to do precisely that and he does so by suggesting, of all things, that it is easier to understand Greek religion if we look at the Dinka religion – the religion of a tribal people in southern Sudan – but not at the ‘better-known’ religions.Why?
Greek religion is not ‘revealed’ as Christianity is; there is no text claiming the status of the ‘word of God,’ not even of His prophets; no Ten Commandments, no creed, no doctrinal councils, no heresies, no wars of religion in which the ‘true believers’ confront the ‘infidel’ or heretic. Central terms of our religious experience such as ‘grace,’ ‘sin’ and `faith’ cannot be rendered into the ancient Greek of the classical period: the central Greek term, theous nomizein, means not ‘believe in the gods,’ but ‘acknowledge’ them, that is, pray to them, sacrifice to them, build them temples, make them object of cult and ritual.There is never an assumption of divine omnipotence, nor of a divine creation of the universe, except in philosophical  ‘theology,’ nor any consistent belief in divine omnipresence. There is no church, no organized body persisting through time comprising those with dogmatic authority, able to define divinity and rule on what is correct and incorrect in religious belief...Greek religion is not theologically fixed and stable, and it has no tradition of exclusion or finality: it is an open, not a closed system. There are no true gods and false, merely powers known and acknowledged since time immemorial, and new powers, newly experienced as active among men and newly acknowledged in worship (italics in the original).
Even if one does not take exception to this description of the Greek religion, our problem is not solved. The Dinka religion, according to Rinehardt who studied it and upon whose material Gould bases his analogy, does not look like religion either. 

For a more succinct summary of our problems regarding the Ancient Greek religion (for longer discussions, see Guthrie 1955; Burkert 1977), one need go no further than Adkins (1969: 377). Discussing the nature of Greek religion in the multi-volume Historia Religionum, he writes
Greek religion was a phenomenon far different from the religions called to mind (by the categories that reflect the questions which the modern reader naturally asks)...The data of Greek religion do not fit into any given category (italics mine).
Even though the data of the Greek ‘religion’ do not fit into any given category, we are to assume that this phenomenon fits into the category of religion. However, this category of ‘religion’ contains, as Adkins tells us, such subcategories as the existence of a creed, the existence of God and such like. Even when some practice (or a set of practices) does not fit any of the subcategories of religion (and thus, one would have thought, the category ‘religion’ itself), Adkins tells us that this should not “prevent the exposition of the nature of Greek Religion”. He goes on to do precisely that in the rest of the article. Again, we are left with puzzles regarding the identity of the subject matter.What phenomenon is being described here? Is it one phenomenon (the ‘Greek religion’) or sets of phenomena unrelated to each other? If the former, what is the difficulty in saying what Greek religion is? If the latter, how can we understand religion better by studying what does not look like religion? Perhaps, the Greeks had no religion at all...

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Understanding why we are in this difficulty requires a good bit more of reading of the book.

Comments (16)

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Of course it is clear that Greek religion had a lot of points of difference with, say, Catholicism, but it's easy to exaggerate them. The Abramaic religions are all based on some old books. The same is true of Greek religion (the Illiad and the Oddysey). Public and private rituals form the core of the religious practice. Certain mythological or real individuals are singled out as gods, heroes, or saints. Priesthood may be a full or part-time job.

By focussing all his attention on doctrine, Dr. B. is picking out one tree in the forest. There is obviously a lot of variance in doctrine among and within the three major Abramaic religions, and some care more about doctrine than others, even if all are relatively doctrinally obsessed.
5 replies · active 626 weeks ago
CIP,

On your blog, you had this "Here is a quick working definition of myth and ritual together. Ritual is doing things and saying things in a way that is considered sacred. Myth is saying things in a way that is also considered sacred."

Here, since Sir Moses Finley is cited as saying that the Greeks have no sacred books, you do not use the word "sacred"
Instead you write "The Abramaic religions are all based on some old books. The same is true of Greek religion (the Illiad and the Oddysey)".

Now, a Sir Moses Finley presumably was not an idiot and knew that the Greeks had ancient literary compositions, yet he had a problem, and wrote that the Greeks had no sacred books. So please explain just how old translates into sacred, at least for poor Sir Moses Finley's sake.

Please treat the use of "religion" in talking about the Greek "religion" just like the word "Indian" used for the inhabitants of the Americas were named by the Europeans. Just because you call something by a name, doesn't mean that they are that, except via a definition by fiat. That is, by definition, I can put both locomotives and Mahatma Gandhi into the term "pif-paf". Then when someone points out that there is no coherence in pif-paf, you can come back brightly with, "insights are easy to have if you define things differently from the conventional usage".

Why there is incoherence in the field of religious studies as noted in the first chapter of Balu's book is quite analogous to this. Knowledge came about when those Europeans realized that those original Americans were not Indians. Fortunately for them, Vasco da Gama did make his way to India before they got too deeply into error. There were no Vasco da Gamas in the field of religion - or actually, much more accurately, the early European observers of the new cultures that they encountered in that era were ignored.
Quoting Balu:
There is also another kind of question, which is more historical in nature. The earliest missionaries and explorers, some of whom recorded their first impressions in an honest way, appear to have seen things differently: the cultures in Africa, Asia and the Americas did not strike them as possessing ‘religion’ in any of the senses they were familiar with.

For example, this is what two Dutch civil servants,3 on a tour through the island Enggano off the West coast of Sumatra during the middle of nineteenth century, had to say:

The Enganese do not have the vaguest notion of religion; all our attempts to make them understand that somebody lived above...were in vain.

If we move further eastwards, we encounter China. The contradictory descriptions of its thought and culture, including the claim that the Chinese knew of no religion, created a debate that lasted nearly a century. Since we are going to encounter it in chapter 3, let us leave China aside for now and take note of a few of the descriptions provided of the Black Africans. Antonio Velho Tinoco declared of the blacks of the coast of Upper Guinea, in a report included in a letter of 1585 sent by the Jesuit priests of Coimbra to the Jesuit General in Rome, that

All the people of the land along the seacoast are black.They are a harmless people... although...tend to be attached to magical practices (inclinada a feitiços)...They have no organized religion, and do not worship the Sun or the Moon or any other idols (nem outros idolos alguns). (Cited by Pietz 1987: 37.)

With respect to the Hottentots, Dapper and van Riebeeck were to go further and declare that the former had no religion – organised or otherwise.

"Much to the surprise of those who came into contact with the Hottentots, there was no question of a religion among them. Never had “anyone, however diligently (he) researched, been able to detect any sign of religion among them; they worshipped neither God nor the Devil. Not withstanding the fact that they know there is one, whom they call ’s Humma, who makes the rain fall on earth, moves the wind, provides warmth and cold, they do not pray to him. Because, they say, why worship this ’s Humma, who gives a double drought once and double the required rains at another time where they would rather have seen it in moderation and appropriately...” (Dapper)...Abraham van Riebeeck found no ideas about God or the Devil among them. Rain, storm and such like were ancient that came habitually...(In Molsbergen, Ed., 1916: 19, n. 1.)

Some among such travellers were even uplifted by this, because it meant that converting the ‘natives’ into Christianity would be so much more of an easy job. Columbus wrote in the journal of his 1492 voyage about the religion of the people he called “los indios”:

“They should be good servants and very intelligent, for I have observed that they soon repeat everything that is said to them, and I believe that they would easily be made Christians, for they appear to me to have no religion.”

And in a letter he wrote shortly after his journal entry, he referred again to the religion of these people. His single sentence on the subject is preceded by his observations on fish and followed by a detailed description of the trees. He wrote,

“They have no religion and I think that they would be very quickly Christianized, for they have a very ready understanding.” (Gill 1987: 174; my emphases.)

Such descriptions raise an intriguing question. Why did the early explorers and missionaries not see ‘religion’ if it was a ubiquitous phe- nomenon in all cultures? In this essay, I would like to probe an answer to this question too.
I had never heard of Moses Finley (or Finkelstein) but even if he were as famous as Newton, whether he called the old books that were at the heart of Greek religion "sacred" or not is beside the point. Professor Nagy chooses to use the word sacred. I prefer a more neutral term, old. It's pointless to argue about definitions, but hardly pointless to point our that certain practices are common to a wide variety of cultures, and that most people call those practices religion.

Dr. B. wants to make an argument that a certain "Western" definition of religion isn't applicable to India and China. The trouble with his argument is that the so-called "Western" definition of religion is his own invention, not that of scholars in the West, who use more inclusive definitions. Of course it's also true that while Greek and Roman religions were (apparently) indigenous to the West, the Abramaic religions were imported from the Middle East and Africa.
We're not arguing about definitions. The fuzziness of the definition points to a conceptual problem.

Anyway, I guess as you near retirement, you become more and more sacred?

I've already said that the problem is analogous to calling the natives of Americans as "Indians". You can make that a linguistic convention of that, just like "religion", but that is just hiding a lack of knowledge.

Anyway, you're more than welcome not to waste your time here.
.. you become more and more sacred? .

I think you mispelled scared.
Perhaps, the Greeks had no religion at all...

He he is up to his old trick of choosing a totally idiosyncratic definition of religion to prove ... something. If you are going to define words differently from the way everybody else uses them, you will have no trouble coming up with original conclusions.
You don't even show a principle of charity, as if the author does not know of your objection. The whole fishing expedition for definitions for what one sees is the whole exercise about. For your definition objection, read the first few paras of this post. http://xyz4000.wordpress.com/2011/03/07/chapter-w...

I am pasting it here:

"Each time I tell someone, whether in a one-to-one discussion or in a conference, “there is no religion in India”, I get the following answer: “Of course, that depends on how you define `religion’”. I answer as follows: “In that case, here is my definition: `Religion=what does not exist in India’. Will that do? If it is really a question of the definition of a word, why does one need to write such a big book?”

There is something both irritating and understandable about this challenge. What is irritating is the lack of goodwill and common sense among those who raise this challenge. Lack of goodwill: they do not grant me that I am aware of this possibility and that, if despite that awareness I write a book, I must have answered this question; lack of common sense: no scientific theory ever makes claims about the world simply by defining a word. It is also understandable because `definitions’ have become fetishes; people think that doing `science’ requires giving a `good’ definition first.

To show that such a definition is not required, the first seven chapters of the book tell a story without defining the word `religion’. If people working with different definitions of the word understand my story, it shows that the story is not dependent on any one definition of the word `religion’. In fact, we will see only in the eighth chapter what `definitions’ are and why they are required. So, my first request: try to read and understand the story first. You will get the definition of the word `religion’, when it is truly necessary to have such a definition.

The first chapter is actually quite important for yet another reason. The manifold citations and arguments have one goal: to raise questions, which the book seeks to answer in the course of the ensuing chapters. That is to say, I think that one of the most important aspects to being a scientific theory lies in its problem solving capacity. In the first chapter, I want to suggest that there are some genuine problems confronting the field of religious studies. To do this, I use citations and analyze them. By the end of the chapter, in principle, the field of religious studies must begin to interest you.

None of the problems raised in the first chapter is formulated properly. We will see as the work reaches its conclusion that we need to have some kind of theory about religion, if we are to formulate problems adequately. But this is a lesson for later.

When you understand what the contradiction is, how and where it comes into being, you have grasped the first chapter. It would be even better, if you can anticipate several obvious strategies one could use to confuse the reader and convince him that there is `really’ no such contradiction. The more insight you get into this evasive strategy, the deeper your insight into the contradiction will be. You will understand the import of the argument better, if you do this mental exercise."
I posted a quote on my blog from a noted Greek scholar, and that post is what Arun is answering. My point is that Dr. B. insists on a definition of religion which is different from the usual one. Despite floundering around in his text, I haven't found a coherent alternative, and I got tired of looking.
In that case, here is my definition: `Religion=what does not exist in India’. Will that do? If it is really a question of the definition of a word, why does one need to write such a big book?”

At which point I conclude that I am listening to an idiot, and go on to something more interesting.
3 replies · active 626 weeks ago
Whose exhibiting stupidity here?

1. One who thinks that B is solving theoretical problems by using his own pet definition
2. One who thinks that definition is all there is in order to produce knowledge. Now it makes sense why many disputes between Nobel economists is sterile: they just appeal to their own pet definitions of inflation. That's where you belong. Shift your focus to natural sciences and see how definitions can settle disputes, and you can gain some wisdom by Einstein's definition of 'mass', and how his definition is different from Newtonian one.
3. Or find some book in the domain of philoosphy of sciences, which discuss about the kind of role definitions play. If you dont have time, read Chapter 8 of B's book, which discusses about definitions.
4. B says: In its simplest form my thesis is conditional in nature: "If Judaism, Christianity and Islam are what religions are, then Indian culture does not have 'native' religions." By the same token, if 'Hinduism' etc are religions, then Judaism etc are no religions. The book builds this thesis in several ways: (a) through historical narrations and analyses; (b) through arguments; (c) by building a hypothesis, etc. If you want to challenge this thesis, you will have to build a thorough-going criticism of the entire book."

The current blog post is from the chapter 1. What B is doing there is part of "historical narrations and analyses".

The western common sense that religion is a cultural universal is a secularized translation of the theological idea that God gave religion to mankind. This common sense is accepted by atheists, social scientists, and those who fight Christianity as well. So, when these social scientists go to Africa, India, Vietnam, they see some stuff, and describe them; and these descriptions are dissimilar to Christianity. But they try to provide a definition that makes religion, both Christianity and other phenemnona in India, Africa.

On the other hand, we have blind Indians, who are blind to see Christianity as a religion. They are like blind pagans of Rome like the last pagan prefect of Rome, Symmachus. They see Christianity as yet another path.

B
Jakob has a post criticizing Dawkins for accepting the idea that God gave religion to mankind. http://xyz4000.wordpress.com/2012/06/23/dawkins-d...
He asks: "So what, if certain details of Roman-Catholicism are human inventions? What is the problem in aspects of religion being “shamelessly invented”?"
What annoyed me about his non-defining definition was that is was empty. Perhaps he was making a joke. The fact is that substantial numbers of people on the Indian subcontinent are monotheists (Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs). That's true even in the Indian nation proper. So if any of those are religions, India has religions, even if the majority don't subscribe to any of the above.

I have often said that I agree that Hinduism has a different character than those religions, and even that where one draws the line between religion and the rest of culture is is always somewhat arbitrary. If that's what Dr. B. means, I agree. If not, I can't tell what he is talking about.
While CIP may think that the definition of religion is obvious, Balu's book has made clear (at least to me) that my previous understanding of the word (and several other related words commonly used in India) was not accurate. I think the book is more useful for people like me who used to, and continue to, equate dharma and religion (than to CIP and other Europeans). If our goal is to understand European culture better, Balu's book provides an excellent starting point.
2 replies · active 626 weeks ago
What is obvious that unlike CIP, we are unable to see through Balu's deceptions. The Heathen is indeed Blind.
No, I don't think that the definition of religion is obvious - precisely because it can't be cleanly separated from other aspects of culture. The anthropological traddition I was educated in was that religion involved ritual, "sacred" objects, totems, or persons, and, usually either personifications of natural forces or spirits.

That definition looks to me like it encompasses a lot of cultures.

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