Saturday, March 09, 2013

Can non-Europeans think?


Hamid Dabashi asks: What happens with thinkers who operate outside the European philosophical 'pedigree'?

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Why is European philosophy "philosophy", but African philosophy ethnophilosophy, the way Indian music is ethnomusic - an ethnographic logic that is based on the very same reasoning that if you were to go to the New York Museum of Natural History (popularised in Shawn Levy's Night at the Museum [2006]), you only see animals and non-white peoples and their cultures featured inside glass cages, but no cage is in sight for white people and their cultures - they just get to stroll through the isles and enjoy the power and ability of looking at taxidermic Yaks, cave dwellers, elephants, Eskimos, buffalo, Native Americans, etc, all in a single winding row.
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The question of Eurocentricism is now entirely blase. Of course Europeans are Eurocentric and see the world from their vantage point, and why should they not? They are the inheritors of multiple (now defunct) empires and they still carry within them the phantom hubris of those empires and they think their particular philosophy is "philosophy" and their particular thinking is "thinking", and everything else is - as the great European philosopher Immanuel Levinas was wont of saying - "dancing". 
The question is rather the manner in which non-European thinking can reach self-consciousness and evident universality, not at the cost of whatever European philosophers may think of themselves for the world at large, but for the purpose of offering alternative (complementary or contradictory) visions of reality more rooted in the lived experiences of people in Africa, in Asia, in Latin America - counties and climes once under the spell of the thing that calls itself "the West" but happily no more.
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I find it only slightly amusing that this critique of something or other is just a tired recital of some cliches of European postmodern "thought."

Philosophy is probably a dead discipline anyway, but if, say, African thought, is going to achieve the goals that this professor (at an American university) thinks it should aspire to, it really ought to try to go beyond what the European, Asian, and yes, African philosophers of the past have achieved.
1 reply · active 626 weeks ago
Try this one as an example of truly post-modern thought:
http://xyz4000.wordpress.com/2013/03/10/the-secul...

Balu & Jakob argue that for the secular state to be religiously-neutral, it has to officially bless a theory of what religion is. And they point out the following:

"In other words, the Hindu traditions refused to accept that theirs was false ‘religion’ and that Christianity or Islam was the true one. Nor were they willing to say that Christianity or Islam was false. They merely maintained that these traditions could co-exist without competing with each other as rivals. This is the Hindu view of the matter. The Semitic religions, on the other hand, advance the claim that they and the Hindu traditions are competing or rival movements. Between these two positions, again, there is no neutral ground: (a) the Semitic religions and the Hindu traditions are competitors with respect to each other, or (b) they are not. The secular state has to choose between these two logically exclusive premises as well."

and pose the problem:

Let us now summarise the four choices the Indian secular state has to make. (a) The ‘Hindu traditions’ and the ‘Semitic religions’ are phenomena of the same kind, or they are not. (b) As such, they are religious rivals, or they are not. (c) As rivals, they compete with each other regarding truth or falsity, or they do not. (d) They can do that because some religion is false, or they cannot because no religion is false. In each of the four cases, these claims are those of the Semitic religions and the Hindu traditions respectively. Each of these assumptions carves the universe up into two exhaustive partitions, because, in each case, one statement is the logical negation of the other. So, what should a liberal state do in such a situation? What choices are open to it, if it wants to remain neutral and secular?
One choice is separation of Church and State. It's hard to do, though, since Christians and Muslims, and yes, even Hindus will resist and try to impose their version on the rest. Hindus do seem to be more tolerant in theory, but in practice have shown themselves more or less equally capable of slaughtering others who offend by belonging to another religion.

One reason the line of separation is hard to draw is that religion and culture are deeply intertwined.
I didn't have the patience to read the whole thing, but if I have figured out the general drift as they circle the subject, somebody is arguing against allowing proseltylization on the grounds that it wouldn't be Indian. In other words, for imposition of a state religion - the Hindu religion. The rest is smoke and mirrors.
15 replies · active 626 weeks ago
You haven't understood what they've written.
Let me try a simple, made-up example. Say in one nation, sports are seen as truth claims, so a person who plays hockey cannot logically think football to be true, and thus can only be a member of the hockey club, or can convert, and only be a member of the football club. In another nation, sports are seen as non-rival practices, and so a person can be a member of the kabaddi club and kho-kho club simultaneously.

In the first nation, the sports neutrality of the state requires it to uphold the exclusionary nature of the sports clubs. In the second nation, the sports neutrality of the state requires it to uphold the non-exclusionary nature of the sports club.

Then, football is introduced to the second nation (or kabaddi to the first).

How does the state uphold its sports neutrality?

It becomes even more complicated because, while I used sports in both nations, one nation has mutually exclusive spots leagues, while the second has non-exclusive music clubs, but the first nation insists that music is sports.

But deal with the simple case first.
I don't think the truth or falsity of religions is relevant. How to do state neutrality is done very well in the US first amendment: don't impose a state religion or prohibit the free exercise of religion. Obviously there are limits if those religions try to deny others their freedoms.

As to your question: yes, islam and Christianity do regard prosetylization as essential, and they do believe they have exclusive access to the truth. So what? (as long as they don't attempt to impose themselves by force, fear or compulsion).

Many countries have state religions. It looks to me as if the Hindutuva people are intent on making Hinduism the state religion of India. That's India's problem, not mine, but I'm not impressed by the smokescreen.
You've utterly failed to understand. I give up.

Balu is as far from Hindutva as the Pope.
Actually I do fail to understand Dr. B.

But having researched Hindutova a bit, I think I can agree with some of it.
But CIP's reply does illustrate a point. Namely, that the American solution to a specific historical problem it faced is **OBVIOUSLY** universally applicable; and that is why post-modern thought is utterly unnecessary. One simply has to do what America or Europe does, and your society will be free of problems. It is because Asian and African societies deviate from the universal truth and norms provided by the West that they suffer from conflict.

Anyone for whom this is blindingly obviously true is going to find reading this blog increasingly frustrating.
I don't claim the American solution is perfect, or universally applicable. But it has been a moderately successful model for one big and moderately diverse country.

India is a much more complex problem (1200 languages, not counting dialects) and has been working this problem for millenia, so it would be nice if they could come up with a solution the world could understand.
CIP,

Launching from your peurile understanding of spoken language, you have now jumped again feet first into another deeper abyss of tomfoolery. When you don't understand something, it's better to say so, than beat about the bush.
My understanding may be senile, but it hasn't been puerile for some time...

Insult is a pretty feeble bit of rhetoric, but the way you wield it reflects well on you. It's inept enough to suggest that you haven't had much practice.
One more try.

Keeping to the sports analogy - what is the underlying theoretical basis for Major League Baseball to have an antitrust exemption? Why is this not granted to other industries?

It may seem strange to you and hard to understand, but "freedom of religion" in the West is the metaphorical equivalent an antitrust exemption for Major League Baseball.
I don't think that word "metaphor" means what you seem to think it means, or at any rate I can't see the analogies. Major league baseball got it's anti-trust exemption the old fashioned way, criminal negligence on the part of Congress. It and a few other sports exemptions are a major scandal, but don't have any obvious connection to religion, since they don't claim religious status, and aren't priviledged because of it.
Let's simplify it.
1. An academic paper has to give a context for the problem statement, and that is what is perhaps tripping you. Put aside any issue related to proselytization for now.

2. Let me explain my "major league anti-trust exemption" analogy a bit more. The conflict between the various denominations of Christianity in Europe and in America was over their truth-claims. (E.g., the conflict was not between various folks about who would head the Church. The conflict was over doctrines.) The solution was to say that the state is neutral with regard to the various religious truth-claims.

The state, however, is not neutral with respect to all truth-claims. Except for some few red-state extremists, no one says that the state should not promote another set of truth-claims, namely science. The state also promotes history, which makes truth claims.

And there is a problem in the US - the remaining religious people do see science as a threat to their truth-claims, and don't want evolution taught; and nor do they want to see science as an input to environmental policy or health policy. They argue that by using science, the state is advancing an anti-religion secularism. It is true that these people would barely be heard from, except that their agenda suits some very wealthy interests.

3. The state also promotes the arts. There is no "wall of separation" between arts and state. What kind of music, for example, does the state promote? Whatever the particular ethnic composition and interests of the people are. So it might be strong on jazz and western classical music; but there are few Indian-Americans, and so it might be much less strong on Indian classical music. Nobody considers this to be a problem.

4. Now move to a society where the native "religionists" - Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Jains, etc., and even Christians (prior to contact with the Europeans) and long-acculturated Muslims - consider themselves more akin to be practicing forms of music than advancing truth-claims.

An attitude like "obviously my school of music is the best, and all the rest of you have tin ears, but hey, it is your music".

An attitude like that of the Dalai Lama:

"No credible understanding of the natural world or our human existence–what I am going to call in this book a worldview–can ignore the basic insights of theories as key as evolution, relativity, and quantum mechanics. It may be that science will learn from an engagement with spirituality, especially in its interface with wider human issues, from ethics to society, but certainly some specific aspects of Buddhist thought—such as its old cosmological theories and its rudimentary physics— will have to be modified in the light of new scientific insights."

5. Now examine what the American theory of the secular state does when applied to such a music-playing society. It will create problems in general, even if we succeed in arguing that the proselytization issue does not fall in this class of problems. The goal here is to get some clarity of thought, once we have that we can go back to the application-of-philosophy plane.

6. Let's backtrack a little - religious neutrality might be stated as follows: the religious truth claims are undecidable, therefore the state will not attempt to decide between them. Science, mathematics, (and civil and criminal cases brought to court), etc., have effective decision procedures, and so the state is entitled to weigh in.

But we've seen that the (American) state also feels entitled to promote anything that does not make truth claims, such as the arts or sports. Maybe even Yoga? (I think there is a dispute in California over Yoga in schools, some see it as a religious system, and are suing on that basis.
But Yoga is no different from Kung-Fu or any of the other Asian martial arts, there is an underlying philosophy to them as well, that can be construed as "religious", and the Asian martial arts share the same roots as Yoga and as some traditional Indian dance forms - they were carried by Buddhists all over Asia. Meanwhile people who are aware of the "religious" roots of Yoga are promoting "Jewish Yoga" and "Christian Yoga".)

Contemplate a little the potential resulting mess because the world does not fit neatly in the categories that underlay the rise of the modern liberal state. The liberal state is going to have to face these challenges.

You may argue that it is a non-problem. But that does not hold, not in a limited way already in the US, and not in a more significant way in India. It is natural that problems with a system will likely be found when it is applied in cases more distant from the problem that it originally solved.

You may find an alternate formulation of the problem than what I have provided which has an easy solution. That would be progress.

The challenge to the liberal state does not mean that we want to abolish it. We need it to work coherently. That will require some thought, no?
I agree that what one calls "religion" is somewhat arbitrary. The US solution was really a response to the religious conflicts of Europe, which were among Protestants and Catholics. It was, however, easily and naturally extended to Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Bahai, Sikhs, and Hindus. Generally speaking, the courts have been fairly generous in protecting a wide variety of practices claimed to be religious by their practitioners.

BTW, I don't accept that European religious conflicts have been mainly about doctrine, though that's always a component. Lines of authority is the big divide between Catholics and most other Christian groups. In any case, the constitution is neutral about doctrine.

Your example of the case of evolution vs. revelation is a good one, illustrating that hard choices still need to be made and will step on somebodies religious toes. I am unpersuaded, though, that the heavy doctrinal component of the Abramaic religions relative to Hinduism is especially consequential in this debate.
One more significant thing - it seems that you think proselytization is an essential part of Christianity and Islam.
Both religions emphasize aggressive prosetylization.
CIP,

In your view, in order for something to be tentatively true, that something has to agree with your psychological state. For instance, look at how you think that IS-LM in economics is true, because it fits with your tastes. IS-LM is false, as shown by theorists in MMT, which is better than New Kenynsian, which agrees with your palate.

Now you come to political theory, and u call some paper 'false' (smoke and errors). Where have you learned this shallow thinking? Sure, you may have a Ph.D in physics, it does not mean anything in other domains like political theory, macro economics. Spend some time learning some basics like "what it means to explain, when some explanation is better than others, whether your psycholigical state is necessary for some explanation to be true, and so on. These questions are hardly discussed in phd quals.
4 replies · active 626 weeks ago
To the extent that I understand you, I disagree. I study a lot of subjects, including history, economics, and anthropology. In economics, especially macro economics, even Nobel winners disagree, so I pick the ideas that i think fit the facts better. History and anthropology are equally controversial. Its true that my specific understanding of Indian history is slight, which is why I come here to be educated by Arun ;-).

I certainly don't claim to understand Dr. B.

I don't claim to be free of prejudice, but I make a reasonable attempt to be open minded to new ideas.
You have to study the very notion of 'facts'. No fact is theory-neutral. Often times, all of humans agree to some implicit or explicit theory; in which case, we call it 'fact'. The second issue is: the relationship between facts and the explanation or hypothesis. Our common sense ideas about religion, inflation, prices, employment are also theory-laden. Just because some theory contests very facts, the theory becomes obsolete.
http://xyz4000.wordpress.com/2011/03/09/%E2%80%98...
I guess from the point of view of physics, a measurement made by an instrument is theory-laden, by the very nature of how the instrument was invented, constructed, calibrated, etc. Impressions the world makes on our brains, I guess, should be considered to be similar, though in the case of our brains, we don't really know the theories underlying the construction of our brains.

I guess there is a further level of theory-ladenness - why did I chose to make this measurement (or highlight this fact)? Why is it a fact of interest versus all the other facts out there? That our (shared) description of the world is reasonably effective is guaranteed by the fact that we have survived the winnowing process of evolution. Still individuals could be insane or have peculiar obsessions and may highlight facts that most of us would consider to be irrelevant to the situation we are in, etc.
We have historical examples wrt theories of instruments. One example is from Balus book: How clerics complaied about Telescopes (or theories of telescopy):

"The second reason has to do with the development of both science
and technology. Not only do they make ‘visible’ what was ‘unobservable’
before; not only do they make ‘perceptible’ some entities, whose existence
we did not know of until the event; but, what is more important,
the very notion of ‘observability’ also changes as our knowledge of the
world evolves. The problem of some clerical contemporaries of Galileo
with the telescope had to do with what they were ‘observing’: were they
seeing what was ‘there’ on the moon, or an illusory image projected by
the telescope which had nothing to do with the so-called mountains on
the moon?"

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