The relevance of this debate - Publius won the argument way back when, resulting in PEOTUS Trump today, the very thing Publius was trying to avoid. Had Republicus prevailed, Clinton would be PEOTUS. Of course, that assumes all intervening history until November 8, 2016 remained the same, which is obviously simultaneously both unknowable and implausible. For instance, we wouldn't have had that disastrous start to the 21st century, POTUS G.W. Bush, which laid the groundwork for much of the subsequent American derangement.
Ultimately all schemes devised by men will fail. Publius's side had a pretty good run.
(PEOTUS = President-Elect Of The United States).
Federalist 68:
Emphasis added:
Friday, March 14, 1788.
To the People of the State of New York:
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States
is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has
escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark
of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has
appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the
President is pretty well guarded.
1
I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the
manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an
eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished
for.
It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the
choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided.
This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to
any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special
purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.
It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made
by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station,
and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a
judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were
proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by
their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to
possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated
investigations.
It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as
possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded
in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency
in the administration of the government as the President of the United
States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the
system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this
mischief. The choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of
electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any
extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was
himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the
electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in
which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose
them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from
them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in
one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle
should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly
adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected
to make their approaches from more than one querter, but chiefly from
the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our
councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature
of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention
have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident
and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the
President to depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be
tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have
referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of
America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and
sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from
eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be
suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator,
representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under
the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without
corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election
will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their
transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice
of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the
conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so
considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor would
it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be
over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which
though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a
nature to mislead them from their duty.
Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive
should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the
people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty
to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration
of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by
making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives,
deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important
choice.
All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the
convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a
number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and
representatives of such State in the national government, who shall
assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President.
Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the
national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of
the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a majority of
the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might
be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is
provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall
select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of
votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the
office.
The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of
President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an
eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for
low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to
elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require
other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the
esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a
portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate
for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will
not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of
seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and
virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the
Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the
executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill
administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of
the poet who says: "For forms of government let fools contest That which
is best administered is best,'' yet we may safely pronounce, that the
true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a
good administration.
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the
President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to
the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in
respect to the latter.
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has
been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been
alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized the
Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that
description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the
convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the
possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that
the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the senator
of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in that of President
of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which
he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other consideration is,
that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the
President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which
recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great
if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is
remarkable that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which
is made would lie against the constitution of this State. We have a
Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the
Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in
casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to
exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President.
PUBLIUS.
______
Anti-Federalist 72
No. 72
On the Electoral College; On ReEligibility of the President
By an anonymous writer "REPUBLICUS," appearing in The Kentucky Gazette on March 1, 1788.
. . I go now to Art. 2, Sec. 1, which vest the supreme
continental executive power in a president-in order to the choice of
whom, the legislative body of each state is empowered to point out to
their constituents some mode of choice, or (to save trouble) may choose
themselves, a certain number of electors, who shall meet in their
respective states, and vote by ballot, for two persons, one of whom, at
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. Or
in other words, they shall vote for two, one or both of whom they know
nothing of.
An extraordinary refinement this, on the plain simple
business of election; and of which the grand convention have certainly
the honor of being the first inventors; and that for an officer too, of
so much importance as a president - invested with legislative and
executive powers; who is to be commander in chief of the army, navy,
militia, etc.; grant reprieves and pardons; have a temporary negative on
all bills and resolves; convene and adjourn both houses of congress; be
supreme conservator of laws; commission all officers; make treaties;
and who is to continue four years, and is only removable on conviction
of treason or bribery, and triable only by the senate, who are to be his
own council, whose interest in every instance runs parallel with his
own, and who are neither the officers of the people, nor accountable to
them.
Is it then become necessary, that a free people should first
resign their right of suffrage into other hands besides their own, and
then, secondly, that they to whom they resign it should be compelled to
choose men, whose persons, characters, manners, or principles they know
nothing of? And, after all (excepting some such change as is not likely
to happen twice in the same century) to intrust Congress with the final
decision at last?
Is it necessary, is it rational, that the sacred
rights of mankind should thus dwindle down to Electors of electors, and
those again electors of other electors? This seems to be degrading them
even below the prophetical curse denounced by the good old patriarch, on
the offspring of his degenerate son: "servant of servants". . .
Again I would ask (considering how prone mankind are to
engross power, and then to abuse it) is it not probable, at least
possible, that the president who is to be vested with all this
demiomnipotence - who is not chosen by the community; and who
consequently, as to them, is irresponsible and independent-that he, I
say, by a few artful and dependent emissaries in Congress, may not only
perpetuate his own personal administration, but also make it hereditary?
By the same means, he may render his suspensive power over the laws as
operative and permanent as that of G. the 3d over the acts of the
British parliament; and under the modest title of president, may
exercise the combined authority of legislation and execution, in a
latitude yet unthought of. Upon his being invested with those powers a
second or third time, he may acquire such enormous influence-as, added
to his uncontrollable power over the army, navy, and militia; together
with his private interest in the officers of all these different
departments, who are all to be appointed by himself, and so his
creatures, in the true political sense of the word; and more especially
when added to all this, he has the power of forming treaties and
alliances, and calling them to his assistance-that he may, I say, under
all these advantages and almost irresistible temptations, on some
pretended pique, haughtily and contemptuously, turn our poor lower house
(the only shadow of liberty we shall have left) out of doors, and give
us law at the bayonet's point. Or, may not the senate, who are nearly in
the same situation, with respect to the people, from similar motives
and by similar means, erect themselves easily into an oligarchy, towards
which they have already attempted so large a stride? To one of which
channels, or rather to a confluence of both, we seem to be fast gliding
away; and the moment we arrive at it-farewell liberty. . . .
To conclude, I can think of but one source of right to
government, or any branch of it-and that is THE PEOPLE. They, and only
they, have a right to determine whether they will make laws, or execute
them, or do both in a collective body, or by a delegated authority.
Delegation is a positive actual investiture. Therefore if any people are
subjected to an authority which they have not thus actually chosen-even
though they may have tamely submitted to it-yet it is not their
legitimate government. They are wholly passive, and as far as they are
so, are in a state of slavery. Thank heaven we are not yet arrived at
that state. And while we continue to have sense enough to discover and
detect, and virtue en(>ugh to detest and oppose every attempt, either
of force or fraud, either from without or within, to bring us into it,
we never will.
Let us therefore continue united in the cause of rational
liberty. Let unity and liberty be our mark as well as our motto. For
only such an union can secure our freedom; and division will inevitably
destroy it. Thus a mountain of sand may peace meal [sic] be removed by
the feeble hands of a child; but if consolidated into a rock, it mocks
the united efforts of mankind, and can only fall in a general wreck of
nature.
REPUBLICUS
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